CONTROL C AND V NOT WORKING FOR A MAC OS X USERS

Cmd+C to copy the selection) and shortcuts using sequences (ex. Pressing and releasing the control key on my Linux client logs this (event-keycode-keysym): Press-37. I tried logging key events with a little Tcl/Tk script. But Ctrl-C Ctrl-V in wordpad/notepad don't work - they react as if just 'c' or 'v' are entered alone. The control key isn't completely dead - mouse clicks with control key seem to work.

Control C And V Not Working For A Mac OS X Users

RFC 4949 recommends avoiding the term message integrity code (MIC), and instead using checksum, error detection code, hash, keyed hash, message authentication code, or protected checksum.If you are using the V-MAC alongside the MAC, enter the overall colour band letter from the V-MAC summary table into the load weight/frequency box. However, some authors use MIC to refer to a message digest, which aims only to uniquely but opaquely identify a single message. As Mac OS X users are not familiar with shortcut sequences.The term message integrity code (MIC) is frequently substituted for the term MAC, especially in communications to distinguish it from the use of the latter as media access control address ( MAC address).

On your keyboard, locate and press the ALT + ctrl + fn keys. Shame to MS for this bug, which is 12 years old (at minimum).To fix this issue, the steps are quite simple. List any control measures you can take to reduce the risk.Informally, a message authentication code system consists of three algorithms:I am now not able to switch between english and second language, but still better than using Shift C Shift for writing c (although this is not working for v it works like Ctrl+V at least in Chrome).

A key generation algorithm selects a key from the key space uniformly at random.To get the Excel copy and paste problems sample file, and see more tips and videos. Use the steps outlined in this article. If this doesn't work, double-check that the keys themselves aren't clogged with dust or other dirt by cleaning out your keyboard with a specialised keyboard cleaner.

Formally, a message authentication code ( MAC) system is a triple of efficient algorithms ( G, S, V) satisfying: It should be computationally infeasible to compute a valid tag of the given message without knowledge of the key, even if for the worst case, we assume the adversary knows the tag of any message but the one in question. That is, return accepted when the message and tag are not tampered with or forged, and otherwise return rejected.A secure message authentication code must resist attempts by an adversary to forge tags, for arbitrary, select, or all messages, including under conditions of known- or chosen-message. A verifying algorithm efficiently verifies the authenticity of the message given the key and the tag. A signing algorithm efficiently returns a tag given the key and the message.

), 1 n), V( k, x, t) = accepted] < negl( n), A MAC is unforgeable if for every efficient adversary A Pr [ k в†ђ G(1 n), ( x, t) в†ђ A S( k, V (verifying) outputs accepted or rejected on inputs: the key k, the string x and the tag t.Pr = 1. S (signing) outputs a tag t on the key k and the input string x.

This implies that the sender and receiver of a message must agree on the same key before initiating communications, as is the case with symmetric encryption. This means that even if an attacker has access to an oracle which possesses the secret key and generates MACs for messages of the attacker's choosing, the attacker cannot guess the MAC for other messages (which were not used to query the oracle) without performing infeasible amounts of computation.MACs differ from digital signatures as MAC values are both generated and verified using the same secret key. To be considered secure, a MAC function must resist existential forgery under chosen-message attacks. Security While MAC functions are similar to cryptographic hash functions, they possess different security requirements. Clearly we require that any adversary cannot directly query the string x on S, since otherwise a valid tag can be easily obtained by that adversary. ), 1 n) denotes the set of the queries on S made by A, which knows n.

Thus, digital signatures do offer non-repudiation. Since this private key is only accessible to its holder, a digital signature proves that a document was signed by none other than that holder. In contrast, a digital signature is generated using the private key of a key pair, which is public-key cryptography.

By contrast to other cryptographic tasks, such as key distribution, for a rather broad class of quantum MACs it has been shown that quantum resources do not offer any advantage over unconditionally secure one-time classical MACs. The simplest such pairwise independent hash function is defined by the random key, key = ( a, b), and the MAC tag for a message m is computed as tag = ( am + b) mod p, where p is prime.More generally, k-independent hashing functions provide a secure message authentication code as long as the key is used less than k times for k-ways independent hashing functions.Message authentication codes and data origin authentication have been also discussed in the framework of quantum cryptography. This can be seen as the one-time pad for authentication. For instance, in Transport Layer Security (TLS), the input data is split in halves that are each processed with a different hashing primitive ( SHA-1 and SHA-2) then XORed together to output the MAC.Universal hashing and in particular pairwise independent hash functions provide a secure message authentication code as long as the key is used at most once. Additionally, the MAC algorithm can deliberately combine two or more cryptographic primitives, so as to maintain protection even if one of them is later found to be vulnerable.

ISO/IEC 9797-3 Mechanisms using a universal hash-function ISO/IEC 9797-2 Mechanisms using a dedicated hash-function ISO/IEC 9797-1 Mechanisms using a block cipher FIPS PUB 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) FIPS PUB 113 Computer Data Authentication, withdrawn in 2002, defines an algorithm based on DES.

The receiver then compares the first MAC tag received in the transmission to the second generated MAC tag. The receiver in turn runs the message portion of the transmission through the same MAC algorithm using the same key, producing a second MAC data tag. The message and the MAC tag are then sent to the receiver. In this example, the sender of a message runs it through a MAC algorithm to produce a MAC data tag. For example, the FIPS PUB 113 algorithm is functionally equivalent to ISO/IEC 9797-1 MAC algorithm 1 with padding method 1 and a block cipher algorithm of DES. These models and parameters allow more specific algorithms to be defined by nominating the parameters.

^ Fred B Schneider, Hashes and Message Digests, Cornell University Doi: 10.1109/IEEESTD.2007.373646. ^ IEEE 802.11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications (PDF). HMAC (hash-based message authentication code) Otherwise an attacker could вЂ“ without even understanding its content вЂ“ record this message and play it back at a later time, producing the same result as the original sender. Time stamp, sequence number or use of a one-time MAC).

^ a b Theoretically, an efficient algorithm runs within probabilistic polynomial time. See Pass's discussions before def 134.2. However, her final forged message must be different from any message she chose to query the signing algorithm before.

^ Nikolopoulos, Georgios M. Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of CRYPTO 84. 'Authentication theory/coding theory'. ^ Simmons, Gustavus (1985). 'SipHash: a fast short-input PRF' (PDF). ^ Jean-Philippe Aumasson & Daniel J.

Archived from the original on. ^ 'FIPS PUB 113 Computer Data Authentication'. Doi: 10.3390/cryptography4040031.

Archived from the original on.